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**American
Interests
in the
Middle East**



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**The Middle East Institute
Washington, D.C.
1969**

This Institute receives frequent requests for a succinct and factual statement of the reasons why the American people should concern themselves with the Middle East. We have, therefore, prepared this short brochure which addresses itself to this interest. A great part of the material in it is drawn, by permission, from the American Enterprise Institute's recently published monograph *United States Interests in the Middle East*. We trust that the brochure will help to further the purpose for which our Institute was founded—to make the Middle East better known to the American public.

Raymond A. Hare

President, The Middle East Institute

Introduction

Although the United States has had a traditional friendship with the peoples and governments of the Middle East, it has been increasingly difficult in recent years to maintain that relationship. The American presence has been seriously questioned, if not threatened, in many Middle Eastern countries, American prestige and influence have suffered, and there has been a growing concern within the United States relative to the direction and implementation of American policy toward the Middle East. This brochure treats of one basic question: What are the interests which command our concern about the state of American relations with the Middle East?*

Briefly, there are a number of such interests, some long-standing and wide-reaching in character. The missionary-educational-philanthropic association with the Middle East dates from the beginning of the nineteenth century, as does the commercial-economic relationship, while the more recent politico-strategic interest dates from the Second World War.

Economically, the Middle East and North Africa are the source of some \$1.7 billion in net dollar inflow each year for the United States from trade and investments. These areas contain some three-quarters of the known oil reserves of the free world, and supply 42 per cent of all the oil consumed in the free world and about three-fourths of Western Europe's requirements. Nearly one half of our income from direct investment in foreign petroleum, a total of \$1.8 billion, comes from the Middle East, or about one-fifth of what the United States receives from all its direct foreign investments. Oil produced by American companies in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa and in Iran is sold primarily to Western Europe and Japan. American companies have important airport and overflight agreements in the Middle East, critical to round-the-world service. Moreover, thousands of Americans have an economic interest in the activities of American companies in the area—not only people who work for oil companies, but for shipping firms, airlines, banks,

*There are no precise boundaries of the Middle East, but the term has long been considered to embrace the states from Egypt to the Persian Gulf and from Turkey to Iran to the Indian Ocean. Recently it has become general practice, adopted by the MEI, to group the countries of North Africa with those of the Middle East when considering the strategic, economic and cultural aspects of American interests and concerns in the area.

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along with the countless stockholders who provide capital for these companies and receive dividends from them.

The Middle East is also important to the United States politically and strategically. For two decades its oil has fueled the land, sea and air forces which support the defense commitments of the United States to the Eastern Hemisphere from NATO to Vietnam. The United States thus has strong security interests in Middle Eastern oil and in political conditions which will preserve its flow, over and above its economic interests. So far the Soviet Union has not attempted to disrupt the flow of the Middle East oil but, unquestionably, Soviet influence in the area has increased, particularly since the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967.

In addition, there are long-standing cultural interests which the United States has in the Middle East. All Western civilization owes a cultural, intellectual and spiritual debt to the Middle East, the veritable cradle of much of Western civilization. During the European Medieval era, it was primarily Muslim scholars in intellectual centers from Baghdad to Cordova who preserved and extended the philosophical legacy of Greece. For their part, the American people have made a special cultural contribution to the modern Middle East. Private American schools and colleges in the area have made significant contributions to Middle Eastern development. They have continued to function even in difficult times when governments were hardly on speaking terms.

In short, there are many sound reasons why the United States should be concerned about the Middle East and the peace, welfare and orderly developments of its many peoples, as a matter of its own self-interest and standing, broadly conceived, with all the countries of the area.

The Politico-Strategic Interests

Development of American Interest, Policy and Commitment

The interest and policy of the United States concerning the Middle East involve commitments to Greece and Turkey under NATO (1952) and to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan under bilateral agreements (1959), while the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, by France, the United Kingdom and the United States embodies principles relative to the peace, security and flow of arms in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These commitments have been undertaken in support of American political objectives which are linked to the security of both the United States and that of the free world. Honoring them is essential to a belief in the American word. Directly associated with security is the American military presence in the Middle East, which includes notably the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The continuance of friendly governments, which reduces the need for reliance on American physical power, is also a factor allied to security. So also is the discouragement of undue dependence of Middle Eastern countries on Soviet power and influence.

For centuries the Middle East has been an area in which the interests of peoples, kingdoms and empires have clashed. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the contest was among the European Great Powers, with France seeking to maintain its traditional position, Imperial Russia driving for warm-water ports, Great Britain striving to protect British routes to India, Australia and other parts of the British Empire, and Germany, a newcomer, ambitious for economic and political expansion. The Second World War brought the United States to its major and enduring politico-strategic involvement with the Middle East. Strategically, the Middle East was a vast intercontinental crossroads between Eurasia and Africa along which were strewn the "wells of power," and it became a critical supply route, operated by the United States, for the delivery of war aid to the Soviet Union, especially through the Persian Gulf and Iran.

Two events, coming on the heels of the Second World War, intensified the American involvement in the Middle East. First, Soviet moves in Iran and Turkey, and Soviet encouragement of the guerrilla warfare in Greece, convinced President Truman that a new Soviet offensive in the Middle East was in the making, as a possible step

toward the achievement of even wider ambitions in Europe and Africa. When Great Britain informed the United States in 1946 that it could no longer bear the financial burden of aiding Greece and Turkey, the principal task of containing Soviet expansion fell to the United States. This responsibility was formally acknowledged in the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947, in one of the great pronouncements of American foreign policy. The second event was the collapse of British efforts to find a viable and acceptable compromise in the Palestine problem.

Containing the Soviet Union

For more than a decade after 1947, the United States continued to view the Middle East as under the constant threat of the Soviet Union—a threat which would have to be countered principally by the United States' own efforts and influence, as well as by the United Nations and various regional security arrangements. In the early 1950s Great Britain and the United States sought the creation of a Middle East Command or Defense Organization (1951-1952), an effort which did not prove fruitful. In 1955 this country helped foster the Baghdad Pact, a regional security arrangement, which was later (1959) transformed into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain as members, and with the United States as an active observer.

In spite of this association, when President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956, and Great Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt (October-November 1956), both the United States and the Soviet Union called for the withdrawal of the invading forces from occupied areas. The major American response to the growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East after the Suez conflict lay in the Eisenhower Doctrine of March 9, 1957. The new Doctrine proclaimed American readiness to assist states requesting aid in their defense of their territorial integrity and political independence against possible Communist aggression. The United States regarded "as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." The Eisenhower Doctrine was invoked in Lebanon in 1958 when some 15,000 American troops were landed to counter what the United States considered a threat to the integrity and

independence of Lebanon. This action was the culmination of a policy under which the United States felt itself directly responsible for the security of the Middle East.

Although containing the Soviet Union was still considered the major concern, after 1958 the immediate need of the United States was felt to be a *modus vivendi* with the Arab states, even though this was difficult to achieve. In promotion of this policy, aid was given to revolutionary, neutral and conservative states, as well as to Israel. The policy was to take a neutral position in the Arab "cold war" and regional disputes, while trying to promote the peace and security of the Middle East. Remaining credibly neutral, never an easy task, in the eyes of all parties became almost impossible within a few years. After 1964, the United States found it difficult to remain on good terms with some of the Arab states. The Arab "cold war," in fact, could not be isolated from the larger "cold war" on the world stage, or from the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Impact of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on American Interest and Policy

Since 1948 the Arab-Israeli confrontation has, perhaps, threatened American objectives in the Middle East more than any other factor, although there are other complicated problems, like that of Cyprus. The Arab-Israeli conflict has not lent itself, nor does it now, to any ready or ideal solution which, in principle, would be acceptable to the contending parties. The Zionist claim to Palestine was enunciated long before the Nazi persecutions added a special urgency and dimension to it. This claim is based on Biblical history and prophecy concerning the "Promised Land" and an "ingathering" of exiles, as well as some one hundred years of immigration and settlement. To Israelis, these constitute rights which are not negotiable. On the other hand, the Arab claim to Palestine is founded on uninterrupted occupation for thirteen centuries and on the right of self-determination. It is, moreover, consonant with the general post-war philosophy of granting independence to virtually every territorially identifiable ethnic group previously governed by colonial powers. In the Arab view, the establishment of the State of Israel by an immigrant minority against native opposition ran counter to the general trend of relinquishing Western dominance over most of

Afro-Asia after establishment of new governments. According to many observers, the depth of Arab resentment and frustration may be attributed to the fact that Palestine was the only major exception to the movement of liberation and anti-colonialism encouraged in the United Nations over the world and practiced by the major Western powers themselves. From the Arab viewpoint, the right of Palestinians to self-determination is equally not negotiable. From a somewhat broader point of view, it may be said that, basically, the struggle in Palestine has been one between two nationalisms equally strongly held, Arab and Zionist, for the same piece of land.

The reality, of course, is that Israel has been on the map as an independent State in the Middle East since 1948. As a member of the United Nations, it benefits from the provisions of the Charter, which call for respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all Member States. Despite the implications as to peaceful coexistence enshrined in the UN Charter, however, conflict occurred in 1948, 1956 and 1967. Numerous other armed clashes have taken place with both parties violating the various truce, demarcation and cease-fire lines.

The United States has always been sensitive to the Zionist position regarding Palestine, although its attitude until the Second World War was, generally, to consider the question a problem of the United Kingdom which held the League of Nations mandate over Palestine, and to avoid assuming any responsibility of its own. The United States was not committed to a political solution of the issue. However, the stream of immigrants to Palestine became a veritable flood when the Nazi terror descended across Europe. The Palestinian Arabs especially, but also many in the neighboring Arab states, became deeply aroused at the prospect of being displaced from their land and homes. There were increasing troubles over the years, and in 1936, the Palestinian Arabs rose in revolt. Great Britain, which had pledged in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, not only to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, but to protect the rights of all its people, sought to limit Jewish immigration by the so-called "White Paper" of 1939, as Nazi drum beats became increasingly audible on the eve of World War II.


In May 1942 leaders of the Zionist movement met in New York and adopted the Biltmore Program of May 11, which called for the establishment of "a Jewish Commonwealth" in Palestine. The United

States now became the primary hope of the Zionists for the achievement of their dream and the center of gravity of their activity shifted from Great Britain to this country. In 1947, Great Britain referred the Palestine problem to the United Nations. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution which both the United States and the Soviet *bloc* supported. It recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, and the establishment of Jerusalem, its Holy Places and environs, as an international enclave. On May 14, 1948, Great Britain terminated its mandate and, at the same time, the State of Israel was proclaimed and open warfare began. President Truman immediately extended *de facto* recognition to the new state, and the Soviet Union, which had supported the partition resolution, followed on May 17. The Arab-Israeli armed conflict was concluded by a series of armistice agreements, if not peace, in 1949. The United States worked through the United Nations to contain the conflict. On May 25, 1950, the United States joined Great Britain and France in a Tripartite Declaration of policy relative to the peace and security of the area. The declaration pledged their governments' efforts to limit arms supplies to the contending parties.

The Seeds of Trouble

The United States took immediate action within the United Nations in 1956 against the Anglo-French-Israeli combined invasion of Egypt in order to limit the conflict. Washington sought again to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dilemma but an uneasy truce was the best that could be achieved. By May-June 1967, the Arab "cold war," the unsettled issues between Israel and the Arab states, and pressures both external and internal all interacted to bring about another round in the Arab-Israeli war and a world crisis relative to the Middle East. In the "Six Day War" of June 5-11, 1967, Israel won a striking military victory which ended in its occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Golan Heights of Syria, territories well beyond its own pre-1967 boundaries.

The Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 and its consequences led a number of people to conclude that a re-evaluation of American priorities and policies in the Middle East is in order. The "cold war"



GREE

MOROCCO

ALGERIA

TUNISIA

LIBYA

-  Arab Countries
-  Non-Arab Muslim Countries
-  Non-Muslim Countries

Atlantic Ocean



TURKEY

SYRIA

IRAQ

IRAN

LEBANON

ISRAEL

JORDAN

KUWAIT

Persian Gulf

QATAR

**SAUDI
ARABIA**

**MUSCAT
AND
OMAN**

Red Sea

YEMEN

**SOUTH.
YEMEN**

SUDAN

**UNITED
ARAB
REP.**

Indian Ocean

interests of the United States still centered along the Northern Tier of the Middle East in Greece, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The only direct American commitments in the area are those to Greece and Turkey under NATO (February 15, 1952) and to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan (CENTO) under the bilateral agreements of March 5, 1959. Although the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, is still a basic expression of American policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, military commitments are not involved, and American interests in inter-Arab rivalries have never been well defined.

The United States has maintained a policy of friendship, aid and protection toward Israel. It also recognizes national interests of the highest order in the Arab world and desires to avoid a polarization of power relationships which might result in the loss by the United States of its friends other than Israel. The way would then be open for the Soviet Union to gain a dominant influence among the Arab states. It seems clear that the disappointment of Arab leaders and people with American policies after the 1967 conflict has contributed to the enhancement of the Soviet influence in the Arab world, especially in Iraq, Syria, the United Arab Republic and Algeria, which consider the Soviet Union a useful friend, a source of economic aid and arms, and a supporter in the United Nations. While the more moderate Arab states have accepted American assistance in developing their economies, the United States seems able to do little to improve its relations with the Arab states or even to offset the alienation which unofficial favoritism toward Israel has produced.

The American position relative to Israel also suffers from ambiguity, although the United States officially has no special, direct commitments to Israel. The United States has a primary interest in containment of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the avoidance of a possible nuclear confrontation with the USSR. It seeks to avoid partisan support for either side. Official statements have stressed the "even-handed" character of American interest and policy in the Middle East. As President Johnson observed on May 23, 1967, in line with long-standing public announcements reminiscent of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, "the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations" of the Middle East and "strongly opposes aggression by anyone in that area, in any form, overt or clandestine." Yet public statements by prominent Americans, on many occasions, have been

partial to Israel in its conflict with the Arab states. The highly articulate, wealthy and generous American Jewish community has, unofficially, but nonetheless conspicuously, sent hundreds of millions of dollars to Israel and, as a result, the United States has been charged with favoritism and bias throughout the Arab world. American interests have suffered in this situation: oil flow has been halted, other trade interrupted, air communications endangered, and the safety of Americans living and working in the Middle East in harmony with local populations jeopardized.

An "even-handed" policy on the part of the United States toward Israel, the Northern Tier states and the Arab states would appear well suited to American interests, although, beyond rhetorical generalities, it has proved almost unattainable in fact. Although publicly critical of the Israeli administrative measures "unifying" Jerusalem, the United States abstained when the UN General Assembly, on June 14, 1967, by an almost unanimous vote, called upon Israel to rescind its actions altering the status of Jerusalem. The United States did, however, join with all the other members of the Security Council on July 3, 1969, to censure "in the strongest terms" actions which Israel had taken to alter the status of Jerusalem. Neither of these resolutions has been implemented, and, from the point of view of American policy, the net effect has been to draw down criticism from both sides.

The United States joined in an unanimous five-point resolution of the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967, which, it was hoped, would lay the basis for an equitable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The resolution called for Israeli withdrawal from territory occupied in the 1967 conflict, the recognition of the right of existence of all states and the ending of all claims of belligerence, free passage through all international waterways, a just solution of the Arab refugee problem, and the recognition of the right of all states to live in peace and security within recognized and guaranteed borders. The United States gave its full support to the mission of Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring in implementation of this resolution. Since then American diplomats have sought possible solutions through discussions at the United Nations with France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, as well as with the Arab states and Israel. Possible solutions were also discussed directly between representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, in conversations

conducted both in Washington and Moscow in the spring and summer of 1969. Today the United States and the USSR are the “super powers” whose interests often clash, but who share responsibility for avoiding disastrous world conflict. Nowhere is this more true than in the Middle East.

The Economic Interests

The United States has long pursued a policy of the “open door” economically in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. Freedom of private American companies to find and produce oil under orderly and reasonable commercial arrangements is a critical American interest, as is the maintenance of air routes, international waterways (the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits), and communications facilities.

American trade and investment in the Middle East and North Africa produce a net annual inflow of nearly two billion dollars into the United States. The bulk of this arises, in one way or another, from oil production, refining and marketing. American oil companies have invested some \$2.85 billion in the Middle East and \$1.5 billion in Africa. These and other investments stimulate indirectly American exports of capital goods, chemicals and consumer products, and management and other services. In addition, American employees working in the Middle East remit substantial portions of their pay to the United States.

Although petroleum is the single most important commodity in world trade, the United States itself imports only about one-fifth of its petroleum requirements, largely from Latin America. However, proved oil reserves in the United States have dropped from a 12.5-year supply in 1958 to a 10-year level at present. On the assumption that the American oil import quota will remain at about one-fifth of total consumption, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has projected North American (largely United States) import requirements at about 2.9 million barrels per day in 1970 and 3.7 million barrels per day by 1980. In the years ahead Middle East and North African oil could become much more of a factor in United States supplies than it has been up to the present.

For Western Europe and Japan, however, Middle East and North African oil is a vital factor now, since neither has substantial oil production of its own. Western Europe in 1967 imported 9 million barrels a day of petroleum, only 35,000 less than its daily consumption. Over six million barrels per day came from the Middle East and North Africa. Japan is the world's largest oil importer. Together the countries of Western Europe and Japan, which are

roughly equal to the United States in terms of production of goods and services and about twice as large in population, drew on the Middle East and North Africa for nearly 9 million barrels of oil a day in 1967. The importance of fuel to industrial production and to the economic health of the industrialized West is obvious. But equally obvious is the direct American interest in these European and Japanese imports. About one half of the oil moving in world trade is foreign oil produced and sold by American firms, roughly two-thirds of which comes from the Middle East and North Africa. Since the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, petroleum companies have accelerated a trend toward the construction of super tankers. These ships, of 200,000 tons or more, can circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope and deliver oil cargoes to Europe at a lower freight cost per barrel than would be involved in shipment by smaller tankers through the Suez Canal.

The largest part of the income from oil operations, of course, goes to Middle East governments, not to the oil companies. The average government share is about 65 per cent and the portion in some cases is as high as 80 per cent. Payments to the major Middle Eastern producing countries have risen dramatically in the last decade, from \$1.07 billion in 1957 to \$2.9 billion in 1967. The combined oil receipts of Libya and Algeria, for example, increased from \$80 million in 1962 to about \$825 million in 1967. Much of this revenue goes to finance imports of American products. In the worldwide trade surplus of \$4.82 billion which the United States had in 1966, \$881 million was attributable to trade with the Middle East. The Middle Eastern and North African countries also put a mark on world finance. Of the \$3.5 billion in gold and foreign exchange they hold as official reserves, some \$2.2 billion is in hard currency. The vast majority of these funds is in dollars or sterling.

Briefly, the United States as well as its major trading and financial partners in Europe and Japan—political allies of the United States—have a clear material interest in the stability and prosperity of the Middle East, both the oil producing countries and their neighbors. But stability need not be defined as adherence to an existing order of things in the Middle East which is rapidly changing under the impact of modern technology. Rather, it might well suggest a continuing and constructive association on mutually acceptable terms from which benefits are derived by both sides.

The Cultural Interests

Dating from about 1819, the American missionary-educational-philanthropic enterprise represents the oldest and most enduring of American interests and concerns in the Middle East—an interest which has matured and expanded since World War II, along with the developing economic and politico-strategic interest in the area. Robert College (1863), the American University of Beirut (1866) and the American University in Cairo (1919) are only the most notable examples and illustrations of a long-standing cultural association with the Middle East. All are widely known and respected as institutions of higher learning and they have had an important influence which has radiated throughout the Middle East. Since World War II they have had both financial and technical assistance from the United States government.

Similarly, since the end of World War II, there has been a deepening involvement of the United States with the Middle East which has led to the need for expanding knowledge of the area, both popular and scholarly, in the United States. The Middle East Institute, founded in 1946, was established to help meet this need.

On the more scholarly level, the university community in the United States has undertaken substantial programs for educating Americans about the Middle East and training them for service there. Under the National Defense Education Act of 1958, Congress provided funds to encourage the establishment of regional centers for language and area studies, with no less than twelve devoted to Middle East studies. These centers have spurred many American students to undertake study and research, often in Middle Eastern institutions, and have helped to bring Middle Eastern scholars and students to the United States.

But there are other strings to the cultural bow in American relations with the Middle East. The Franklin Books Program, Inc. (1952) has distributed more than 30,000,000 copies of translated American books on a non-profit basis, with much of the output going to the Middle East. American books have also been channeled into the Middle East in large numbers through the libraries of the United States Information Agency. In many Middle Eastern cities the USIA library is the best available. Despite political problems in the Middle

East, the Peace Corps has been a further and positive cultural link. The Near East Foundation, the oldest of private technical assistance organizations, began during the First World War as a relief operation. It emerged into its present notable area of success in the Middle East by helping others to help themselves. The American Friends of the Middle East (founded, 1951), with four offices in the area, has done important work in counselling and placement of Middle Eastern students coming to the United States. Although in a more special way, the Near East Emergency Donations, Inc. (NEED), created after the 1967 conflict by American businessmen, which donated some \$9 million to aid thousands of Arab refugees, has not only helped in relief but given important impetus to education and training. On a longer term basis, American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA) was established after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war to increase the overall level of American assistance to the Palestine Arab refugees and to further American understanding of the refugee problem.

In spite of the efforts, it is still true that all too few Americans are aware of these interests and activities.

Middle Eastern Prospects

As we have seen, American objectives in the Middle East rest on the politico-strategic, economic and cultural interests of the United States, which extend throughout the area. These interests are neither ephemeral in character nor narrowly limited or confined in scope. Peace and stability, with freedom, are among the primary American objectives in the Middle East. They require that the area enjoy political independence and be free from external domination. The United States also seeks to encourage democratic political institutions and processes in the Middle East, together with social and economic development sustained by native initiative and resources. Within the broader concept of freedom, the Middle East should participate in the intercourse of the community of nations—trade, transit and communications, and cultural exchange. These objectives allow for a genuine mutuality of American and Middle Eastern interests. The

United States seeks no territorial gains or special privilege in the area, and its long record of economic assistance is ample testimony that control or domination is not a role to which it aspires. In principle, there is nothing in the American-Middle Eastern relationship to make peaceful and constructive collaboration impossible.

Despite the evolution in military technology and concepts, the Middle East continues to occupy a vital strategic position. Discoveries of new oil deposits in other parts of the world have not changed the fact that the Middle East is still the primary supplier of petroleum to Europe and Japan and is likely to hold this position. Similarly, the area is bound to figure prominently in any global arrangements for maritime and air transportation, despite the temporary deactivation of some routes, such as the Suez Canal. It is, therefore, to be expected that the Middle East will continue to play a very serious role in Western political, economic and strategic thinking.

The Arab world is beset with persistent problems, including the rivalry between the more traditional and the more radical régimes, which have had serious, unsettling effects upon the international relations and domestic politics of the area. These problems have also contributed to the increased Soviet presence. As a result, the American position has suffered reverses in the rupture of diplomatic relations, economic boycott, temporary oil embargoes, sequestration of properties, and the closing or suspension of certain cultural institutions. But perhaps the greatest damage has come from the growing conviction of many Arabs that the United States is basically committed to policies inimical to their national aspirations.

Peace and stability in the Middle East, as in other parts of the world, are conditioned by many complex factors, all of which need to be kept in mind when considering the strife and turmoil which mark this area. Domestic politics in the Middle East, ideologies which condition behavior, conflicting claims, intra-regional rivalries, strident nationalisms, and the competing interests and policies of the Great Powers, including those of the United States and the Soviet Union, all have a bearing on the peace, security and welfare of the peoples and nations of the Middle East.

As one of the Great Powers, broadly and deeply involved in the Middle East on an enduring basis, the United States is inevitably confronted with complex problems. If solutions to these problems prove impossible, or overlong in the making, we have a duty to see

that conflict does not become holocaust. But a necessary concern for emergencies should not lead us to ignore or neglect our many other interests in the area. These make it necessary for policy to be made on a regional basis, which takes the sum of the parts as its point of departure.

Moreover, Americans do not have exclusively to rely on government action. In many areas, private endeavors—in business, the professions, the academic world and the press—equal if they do not transcend official government action. Provided the two are not working at cross purposes, they complement each other and constitute an important source of national strength.

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